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Financing transportation with land value taxes
Eﬀects on development intensity
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Abstract: Asigni cantportionoflocaltransportationfundingcomesfromthepropertytax.  etaxisconventionallyassessedonbothland
and buildings, but transportation increases only the value of the land. A more direct and eﬃcient way to fund transportation projects is to
tax land at a higher rate than buildings.  e lower tax on buildings would allow owners to retain more of the pro ts of their investment in
construction, and would be expected to lead to higher development intensity. A partial equilibrium simulation is created for Minneapolis,





 e accessibility of a property has a substantial value that is
capitalized in the price of the land. Conventional property





value while also improving the incentive structure for devel-
opers. A parcel of land has a value based on surrounding im-
provements the community has made, and an increase in the
taxonlandallowsthecommunitytokeepagreaterportionof
the value generated by public projects. Buildings have value




 e component of conventional property tax that re ects
building value creates a disincentive for owners to improve
their properties and results in less construction than would
likely occur in an untaxed market. In contrast, the portion of
the property tax that falls on land has no eﬀect on land sup-
ply. Reducing the tax on buildings thus improves economic
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ulative holding of vacant parcels, as the higher tax rate causes
ownerseithertodeveloportoselltosomeonewhowill. Acor-
respondingdecreaseinthelevyonbuildingsenablesproperty
owners to commit more funds toward development without
having to account for as great a rise in property tax. Future
urbandevelopmentisthenexpectedtofollowamorecentral-
ized, compact pattern (Batt 2003).  is increased density, in
turn, makes the provision of public transit service more feasi-
ble(ParsonsBrinckerhoﬀ1996;PushkarevandZupan1977).
Because the property tax is only partially based on land
value, owners can pro t at the expense of others when the
value of their land increases because of improvements to in-
frastructure or to nearby properties. Transportation projects
can generate land value increases well in excess of their costs,
and to capture a portion of this gain would be suﬃcient to
fund some projects without additional public expenditure
(Batt 2001; Benjamin and Sirmans 1996; Riley 2001). In
Minnesota, property taxes are a primary source of local road
funding, and the ability of cities to raise revenue by other
meansislimited(Zhaoetal.2008). Providedthatassessments




e t from and payment toward transportation facilities. Even
if overall property values fall due to broader economic fac-




velopers’ decisions on when, where and how much to build.
 e purpose of this paper is to simulate the development re-
sponse to split-rate taxes in three sample cities in Minnesota.
Conclusions from previous research on the economic eﬀects
of the tax are discussed along with a summary of previous ap-
plications.  e data, methodology and results of the simula-
tion are explained next, followed by a discussion of the con-
clusionsandlimitations.
2 Extent of Use
 e most prominent applications of split-rate property taxes




and Scranton adopted the split-rate tax at that time. In the
1970s, the diﬀerential was allowed to increase, and the land





create an incentive for redevelopment and new construction
indepressedareas.
AlistofPennsylvaniacitiestaxinglandandbuildingsatsep-
arate rates as of 2008 is given in Table 1.  e land and build-
ingratesandthediﬀerentialbetweenthemvarywidely,partly
due to the method of assessment used in Pennsylvania.  e
estimated market value at the last county-wide reassessment,
or base year value, is multiplied by a prede ned assessment
ratio and then by the tax rate to calculate the amount of the
tax. If the last reassessment was long ago or the assessment
ratio is low, a higher tax rate can compensate. Several other




ditional revenue or to facilitate development, rather than as a
speci cfundingmechanismfortransportationprojects. Split-
rate taxation is most applicable at the local level, because city
and county governments already levy property taxes, provide









Past research on split-rate taxes has been focused largely on
determining their eﬀects on economic development, density
and land value. Brueckner (1986) conducted a formal anal-
ysis, establishing that a split-rate tax increased the “level” of
improvements per acre. In a general equilibrium model, Di-
Masi (1987) concluded that increasing the land rate relative
to the building rate decreases rents and housing prices both
overallandateachdistancefromthecitycenter,andincreases
population density at all locations within the city. Resident
welfare, in terms of aﬀordable housing and wage level, was
found to be optimal when land was taxed at three times the
rate on improvements. Brueckner and Kim (2003) evaluated
the spatial eﬀects of the conventional property tax and found
that when the elasticity of substitution between housing and
othergoodsishigh,ahigherpropertytaxcausesdenserdevel-
opment and more compact city size. When the elasticity is
low, the higher tax decreases density and causes the city area
to expand.  ey also considered replacement of the property
taxwitharevenue-neutralswitchtoalandtaxandconcluded
that the city area would shrink under such a scenario. Song
and Zenou (2006) also developed a model showing that in-
creasing the property tax results in a smaller city area.  eir
research included an empirical analysis of several urban areas
in the United States, which demonstrated that the cities with
higherpropertytaxeshaddevelopedmorecompactly.
A signi cant body of empirical research has been directed
at the Pennsylvania applications and particularly on Pitts-
burgh, which has been the largest and most visible example.
 emostcomprehensivestudyofsplit-ratepropertytaxation
in Pittsburgh was conducted by Oates and Schwab (1997).
 e research sought to explain the sharp increase in commer-
cial construction in the 1980s compared to the previous two
decades, while most similar cities in the region saw a substan-
tialdrop. In1976,Pittsburghbegantoraiseitslandtax: from
twice the rate levied on buildings, the land tax rate ultimately
reachednearlysixtimesthebuildingrate. However,therewasFinancingtransportationwithlandvaluetaxes 
Table 1: Pennsylvaniacitieswithsplit-ratepropertytaxes,2008.
Split-rate Land Building Taxrate Assessment Assessment
City taxadopted taxrate taxrate ratio baseyear ratio
Aliquippa 1988 81.00 11.40 7.11 1982 50%
Allentown 1997 50.38 10.72 4.70 1991 50%
Altoona 2002 230.31 14.56 15.82 1958 75%
Clairton 1989 28.00 2.22 12.61 2002 100%
DuBois 1991 89.00 3.00 29.67 1989 25%
Duquesne 1985 19.00 11.47 1.66 2002 100%
Ebensburg 2000 27.50 7.50 3.67 2005 100%
Harrisburg 1975 28.67 4.78 6.00 2002 100%
LockHaven 1991 96.79 16.97 5.70 1995 60%
McKeesport 1980 16.50 4.26 3.87 2002 100%
NewCastle 1982 24.51 6.93 3.54 2003 100%
Scranton 1913 103.15 22.43 4.60 1973 100%
Steelton 2000 12.00 12.00 1.00 2002 100%
Titusville 1990 59.16 19.00 3.11 1971 75%
Washington 1985 82.63 3.50 23.61 1985 25%
Source: ListofcitiesfromKingandNesbit(2007);2008taxratesfromtherespectivecounty




ment of the building tax was available for new construction.
In light of these factors, Oates and Schwab concluded that
raising the land tax was not the primary cause of the develop-
mentincrease,butthatitwasasigni cantenablingfactor.  e
primary motivation for increasing the land rate was a revenue
shortfall,andraisinganyothertaxwouldhaveintroduceddis-
incentives that might have had an adverse eﬀect on develop-
ment. Otherstudies(Bourassa1987;Cord1983)foundsome
correlation between the split-rate tax and increased develop-
ment,butdeterminedthattheeﬀectwasnotconsistentacross
propertytypesandidenti edotherconditionsthatcouldhave
sparked an increase in construction in the city. Weir and
Peters (1986) determined that the higher rate on land still
amounted to too low a carrying charge to factor into devel-
opmentdecisions.
WhenBourassa(1990)extendedhisPittsburghstudytoin-
clude two other locations, he found that the tax on buildings
had a signi cant inverse relationship to the amount of new
construction, but that increasing the tax on land had no sig-
ni cant eﬀect. Plassmann and Tideman (2000) established
that the tax diﬀerential had a statistically signi cant eﬀect on
construction value and on the number of building permits is-
sued, but not on the value per permit. Although their model
did not evaluate land and building rates separately, their re-
sults indicate that increasing the tax diﬀerential (either by re-
ducingtherateonbuildingsorbyincreasingtherateonland)
leads to more construction. A more recent empirical study of
PennsylvaniaapplicationswasconductedbyBanzhafandLav-
ery (2008), who separated density from dwelling size, noting
thatincreasingtheinvestmentratioofcapitaltolandcouldre-
sult in larger housing units rather than more units in a given
area. If the dwelling size eﬀect were greater than the density
eﬀect, the result would be a decrease in development inten-
sityandamoresprawlingcity.  eirresultsindicatedthatthe
numberofroomsperunitoflandareaincreasedincitieswith




Researchers have also considered the administrative and
political rami cations of split-rate taxation. Hartzok (1997)
suggestedthatthetransitionshouldbegradual,withnomore
than 10–20 percent of the tax burden shi ed from buildings
to land in a given year. A revenue-neutral shi  would prevent
the public from falsely associating the split rate with a tax in-
crease. Equally important to the success of a split-rate tax is
the accurate, timely and fair assessment of land values. Mills
(1998) argued that government lacks both the incentive and .




are accurate (Chapman et al. 2009). One possible (but ex-
pensive) way for assessors to determine accurate land values
would be to purchase property at market value, demolish any
improvements and resell the vacant parcels (Anas 1998). If
the tax is based on land values under optimal use, zoning and
other restrictions limit the ability of property owners to use








Citiesmetropolitanarea.  e rstdatasetconsideredforthis
analysiswastheparcel lecreatedbytheMetropolitanCoun-
cil  (the Twin Cities’ regional planning organization), which
includes land areas and estimated market values for land and
buildings. Buildingareasareincludedforsome,butnotall,of
thesevencountiesinthemetropolitanarea,andthenonlyfor
residential properties; therefore, the sample size would have
been severely restricted if building size were used as a depen-
dentvariable. Anotherlimitationoftheparceldataisthatthe
valuesforlandandbuildingsareestimates,andsincenojuris-
diction currently taxes them separately, there is no incentive
for the assessors to emphasize the accuracy of the land values
aslongasthetotalpropertyvaluesareaccurate.
In order to simulate separate tax rates for land and build-
ings, more reliable land valuations were needed. A hedonic
pricing model for residential property in Hennepin County,
whichincludesthethreemunicipalitiesstudied,hadbeencre-
atedaspartofapreviousproject(IaconoandLevinson2009).
 e independent variables in that model were categorized ac-
cording to whether they aﬀected the value of the parcel (e.g.
neighborhood factors, school quality, accessibility) or of the
structure (e.g. age, number of bedrooms and bathrooms).
Sources for the dataused to createthe model included single-
familyresidentialsalesdatafromtheMinnesotaMultipleList-




accountability data from the Minnesota Department of Edu-
cation 2008.  is model was used to determine the average
land value in each census block as a proportion of total prop-
erty value.  e proportion was then applied to the total mar-
ketvalueasestimatedbythecountyassessorsandgiveninthe
parceldataset. Becausehousesandthelandonwhichtheysit
are almost always sold together, there is plenty of market data
tocorroboratetheseestimatesandtheyareassumedtobereli-
able. In contrast, sales of vacant lots occur rarely enough that
it is not always possible to use sales data for similar parcels to
determineaccuratelandvaluesindependentofanystructures.
 eresultingdistributionoflandvaluesisshowninFigure1.
 e Metropolitan Council’s major highways data set  was
used to calculate variables representing the distance from the
center of each block to the nearest Interstate and major high-
way.  e distances to downtown Minneapolis (intersection
of Nicollet Avenue and Seventh Street) and downtown Saint
Paul (intersection of Seventh Street East and Cedar Street)
were also computed. Accessibility measures, expressed in
terms of the population and employment reachable within
30 minutes by car, were available for each 1990 Metropolitan
Council transportation analysis zone (TAZ) from an earlier
project(El-GeneidyandLevinson2006).
Since buildingsize datawas not available intheparcel data
for most of the area, development intensity was modeled in
termsofhousingunitsandcommercial oorspaceperunitof
land area. Block-level housing unit counts were taken from
2000 U.S. Census data. Employment for each block in 2000
wasdeterminedbydistributingretail,non-retailandtotalem-
ployment counts in each 2000 Metropolitan Council TAZ
among the included blocks using proportions derived from
2005 data from the Longitudinal Employer-Household Dy-
namics program of the U.S. Census Bureau (Levinson et al.
2010). Block-level counts from this source were aggregated
to the TAZ level, and each block was assumed to contain the
sameproportionofjobsintheTAZin2000asin2005.
Among the issues that arise from the level of aggregation
used is that the city and county are not the only jurisdictions
thatlevypropertytaxes. Additionaltaxesareleviedbyschool
districts,  re protection districts, watersheds and for other
special purposes. In the process of deciding on the appropri-
ate location and intensity of construction, a developer would
consider the total property tax liability, not just that portion
chargedbythecity. Anyeﬀectofasplitmunicipalrateonde-
velopment would be muted by the continuation of the con-
ventional tax by other entities. Only city and county taxes
were included in the analysis, but any eﬀect of a split munici-








Figure 1: Regional distribution of land values (m2), calculated by applying the land proportion of total property value in each
Censusblockfromthehedonicmodeltoassessors’estimatesoftotalvalue. .
palrateondevelopmentwouldbemutedbythecontinuation
of the conventional tax by other entities. Also, aggregating
the building values introduces the assumption that the aver-
age housing unit size and the building quality in terms of the
average construction cost per unit remain  xed when the tax
rates vary.  is is not necessarily true, but is not unreason-
ableandwouldbeconsistentwithpreviousempiricalresearch
(BanzhafandLavery2008).
 e employment count in each block was converted to de-
veloped oorareausingconversionfactorsbasedonthosethat
HennepinCountyassumedina scalimpactmodelfordevel-





mercial categories proportionally using land areas taken from
2005 Metropolitan Council land use data. Agricultural land
wasincludedwithindustriallandtocomputedensity,butwas
subtracted from the area used to apportion employment be-
causeitwouldotherwisehaveproducedanunreasonablyhigh
numberofindustrialjobs.
 e analysis assumed that land would remain in its cur-
rent use, and that existing zoning regulations would remain
in place, if a split-rate tax were adopted. Residential density
was computed by dividing the number of housing units by
the area in each block zoned for residential use, and nonres-
idential density by dividing developed  oor area by the sum
ofcommercialandindustriallandarea.  etotalareaconsid-
ered is less than the total land area in each block, as certain
areas unlikely to develop—such as parks, cemeteries, vehicu-
lar rights-of-way and open water—were not included. Blocks
withnoresidentialareawerenotconsideredfortheresidential
model, and blocks with no commercial or industrial develop-
ment were le  out of the nonresidential model. Blocks with
no development or no parcel records were not used in either
model.
5 Methodology
 e demand to develop a parcel of land is assumed to depend
ontheparcel’saccessibilityandonthecostofdevelopment,in-
cluding property taxes. Transportation access aﬀects residen-
tial and nonresidential properties in diﬀerent ways: a desir-
ablebusinesslocationisonethatcanbereachedeasilybyboth
workersandcustomers,withretailbusinessesespeciallydrawn
to locations with high traﬃc and high visibility; a desirable
residential location, on the other hand, is one with access to
jobs and services, but low impacts from negative externalities
of transportation such as noise and air pollution. Because of
thesediﬀerences, and becausethequalitativecriteriainvolved




of the relevant county assessment oﬃces.  e blocks were
thenmatchedwithmunicipalitiesusingageographicinforma-
tion system (GIS) to determine the tax rate eﬀective in each
block. A correlation was established between development
density and municipal property tax rate, but since no local
government in the area uses a split-rate tax, an alternate ap-
proach was necessary to separate the eﬀects of the land and



















 esymbol representsthetaxrate;L andS denotethe
taxes on land and structures, respectively. In the base case us-
ing a conventional property tax, L = S = .  e seven
percent discount rate was obtained from Oﬃce of Manage-
ment and Budget recommendations (Oﬃce of Management
and Budget 1992) for bene t-cost analyses of federal invest-
ments. Once the current values of city and county taxes were
determined,theunitcostsofland,housingandnonresidential
 oorareawerecomputedforeachblockusingEquations3–5.
 e cost of land CL given by Eq. 3 is used in both models.
Eq. 4 de nes the residential development cost CH per hous-
ing unit, and Eq. 5 gives the nonresidential development cost
CJ per square meter of  oor area. As with the conversion of
employmenttodeveloped oorareaabove,thetotalstructure
valueineachblockisdistributedproportionallyusingtheland
areaineachblockdevotedtoeachuse.  esymbolAD repre-
sents the total developed area, AR is the area zoned for resi-







































tial model by Eq. 7.  e dependent variables IR and IN in-
dicate residential and nonresidential density, respectively, in
termsofhousingunitspersquaremeteroflandanddeveloped
 oor area per square meter of land.  e distances d to the
Minneapolis and Saint Paul central business districts and to
the nearest major highway centerline are straight lines. CL,
CH and CJ are the cost variables, including the tax rates, as
calculated by Eqs. 3, 4 and 5. If the costs for developing resi-
dentialandnonresidentialpropertieswereindependent,some
cross-elasticity might be observed, but the way they are de-
 ned results in collinearity. Accessibility represents the pop-
ulation and number of jobs reachable within 30 minutes by
car. Distanceswerecalculatedinkilometersandcostsinthou-
sands of dollars. Summary statistics for the residential model
are given in Table 2 and for the nonresidential model in Ta-
ble3.
ln(IR) = f (CL,CH,ddowntowns,dhighway,Accessibility) (6)
ln(IN) = f (CL,CJ,ddowntowns,dhighway,Accessibility) (7)
Taxratesforpredictionpurposeswerecalculatedassuming
revenue neutrality using Eqs. 8 and 9, a system similar to that
used by Cho et al. (2008).  e levels of revenue raised by ex-





parcels in each city.  e proposed land tax rate L and struc-
turetaxrateS togethermustyieldthisamount.  evariable
 in Equation 9 represents the diﬀerential between land and
building rates and must be input. To test a variety of rate dif-
ferentials similar to those currently in use in Pennsylvania, 
values of 2, 5, 10 and 20 were tested.  e two equations to-
gether were then used to determine revenue-neutral test rates
forlandandbuildings.
R = (L+S) = LL+SS (8)





are statistically signi cant at the 99 percent con dence level.
 e signs on the cost variables are as expected, with increased
density associated with higher land costs and lower structure
costs.  eexpected negativesignsalso appear ontheparame-
ters for the distance and accessibility variables. Residents are
expected to concentrate in areas with access to large numbers
ofjobsandcommercialdevelopment,andinareaswithlessac-
cess to population that could represent competition for those
opportunities.
In the nonresidential model, the cost variables and the dis-
tances to the downtowns are statistically signi cant at the 99
percentcon dencelevel. Asintheresidentialmodel,theland
andbuildingcostvariablesarebothsigni cantanddisplaythe
expected signs. Although they are not statistically signi cant,
the parameters on the other variables display the anticipated
signs, except the accessibility to population. At the census
block level, population and employment are highly and in-
versely correlated, due to the Census Bureau’s goal of making
blocksashomogenousaspossible.
 eequationsresultingfromtheregressionswerethenused
to predict the eﬀects of a split-rate tax in Minneapolis, Rich-
 eldandBloomington.  esemunicipalitiesareadjacentand
were chosen to represent the existing development intensity
typicalinacentralcity,aninner-ringsuburbandanoutersub-
urb.  e revenue-neutral tax rates calculated for the analysis
usingtheprocedureexplainedabovearedisplayedwiththeav-
eragepredictedintensitychangesforeachcityinTable6. Pre-
dicted changes are displayed as a percentage of the modeled
intensity under the existing tax rates.  e percentages shown
are averages of the projected density increase in each census
block in each city, weighted by the area in the block devoted
toresidentialornonresidentialdevelopment.
 e spatial distribution of the predicted increases in devel-
opment intensity for residential property is presented in Fig-
ures ?? and ?? and for nonresidential development by Figures
?? and ?? for land : structures tax ratios of 2 : 1 and 5 : 1.
 e intensity increase is most pronounced in Minneapolis,
where the necessary tax rate on land is highest. Within Min-
neapolis,landvaluesarehigherinthesouthernhalfofthecity,
so this is where the greatest increase in residential density is .
Table 2: Summarystatisticsforcensusblocksincludedintheresidentialmodel.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max
Citytaxrate 34.71 12.13 32.53 3.98 102.82
Countytaxrate 35.86 6.28 38.57 25.20 44.02
lnhousingunitsperunitlandarea(m2) −7.38 1.33 −7.19 −14.69 4.15
Landcostpersquaremeter($1000) 1.09 1.00 0.90 0.00 31.55
Structurecostperunit($1000) 765.96 1466.14 538.86 0.00 55355.58
DistancetodowntownMinneapolis(km) 19.93 11.96 18.14 0.10 63.56
DistancetodowntownSt.Paul(km) 22.93 13.49 20.77 0.09 75.57
Distancetonearesthighway(km) 1.75 2.08 1.11 0.00 17.36
lnpopulationaccessiblein30min 13.96 0.69 14.24 10.68 14.63
lnemploymentaccessiblein30min 13.45 0.88 13.81 9.38 14.16
Note: Costs are present values of perpetual ownership; distances are calculated from block
centroids.
Table 3: Summarystatisticsforcensusblocksincludedinthenonresidentialmodel.
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Median Min Max
Citytaxrate 35.66 12.15 31.97 3.98 102.82
Countytaxrate 36.37 6.27 38.57 25.20 44.02
ln oorareaperunitlandarea(m2) −2.39 2.20 −2.37 −11.48 14.20
Landcostpersquaremeter($1000) 1.29 3.54 0.75 0.00 101.86
Structurecostpersquaremeter($1000) 17.97 69.63 3.77 0.00 3270.83
DistancetodowntownMinneapolis,(km) 18.60 11.97 16.40 0.11 61.66
DistancetodowntownSt.Paul,(km) 21.69 13.77 19.38 0.06 74.03
Distancetonearesthighway,(km) 1.33 1.90 0.75 0.00 16.08
lnpopulationaccessiblein30min 14.03 0.68 14.30 10.68 14.63
lnemploymentaccessiblein30min 13.53 0.84 13.89 9.38 14.16





cially when the split becomes larger. As the signs on the land
and building cost parameters indicate, a ratio of 5 : 1 results
in greater density than a ratio of 2 : 1.  e resulting maps for
ratios of 10 : 1 and 20 : 1 are not displayed but indicate still
greaterdevelopmentintensity.
 is model represents a partial equilibrium state of devel-
opment in the cities analyzed. It demonstrates the supply of
development that property owners would prefer to provide
within the city limits given changes in the property tax sys-
tem, but does not account for demand from tenants for more
leasable space. Presumably, demand would increase with sup-
ply—toapoint. Compellingbuilderstoprovidemoreunitsin
order to cover increased land taxes and take advantage of the
reduced cost of building would create a market favorable to
renters. However,whetherdemandwouldincreaseenoughto
justify the predicted density shown in the  gures is not at all
certain. Moreover, whether the in ux of businesses and res-
idents would come from elsewhere within the metropolitan
areaorfromoutsideitremainsunknown.
 e model does not consider the cost of building in other
citieswhenpredictingtheeﬀectoftaxchangesinaspeci ccity
on development density. If only a few cities within a larger
metropolitan region were to adopt a split-rate tax and then
see a spike in building, that eﬀect might erode as neighbor-
ing cities followed their example.  e scale of development
indowntownMinneapolisisuniquewithinthemetropolitan
area, but typical levels of new construction in Rich eld andFinancingtransportationwithlandvaluetaxes 
Table 4: Residentialmodelresults.
Variable Parameter Std. Error t Statistic Sig.
Intercept −4.18812 0.48345 −8.66 **
Landcostpersquaremeter 0.46842 0.00641 73.13 **
Structurecostperunit −0.0002827 0.00000365 −77.53 **
DistancetodowntownMinneapolis −0.01378 0.00135 −10.20 **
DistancetodowntownSt.Paul −0.01603 0.0007569 −21.18 **
Distancetonearesthighway −0.14786 0.00316 −46.78 **
lnpopulationaccessiblein30min. −0.58163 0.06338 −9.18 **
lnemploymentaccessiblein30min. 0.4111 0.04274 9.62 **
Note: Dependentvariable=ln(housingunitsperm2). R2 = 0.51,n = 31511. **=signi cant
at99%con dencelevel.
Table 5: Nonresidentialmodelresults.
Variable Parameter Std. Error t Statistic Sig.
Intercept 0.12213 2.05322 0.06
Landcostpersquaremeter 0.09038 0.00626 14.44 **
Structurecostpersquaremeter −0.0114 0.00030873 −36.92 **
DistancetodowntownMinneapolis −0.04196 0.00509 −8.24 **
DistancetodowntownSt.Paul −0.01542 0.00312 −4.95 **
Distancetonearesthighway −0.0051 0.01342 −0.38
lnpopulationaccessiblein30min. −0.34614 0.27607 −1.25
lnemploymentaccessiblein30min. 0.26242 0.18254 1.44
Note: Dependent variable = ln( oor area (m2) per land area (m2)). R2 = 0.27,n = 7679. **
=signi cantat99%con dencelevel.
Bloomington could be replicated in any of several other sub-
urbs. Any resulting density change would in turn aﬀect the
optimal distribution of land uses within the city, as well as
land values. If, for example, commercial development were
tointensifymorequicklythanresidentialdevelopment,zones
could be shi ed from commercial to residential uses.  e
change in land value produced by a higher land tax may ne-
cessitate adjustments to the tax rates until a revenue-neutral
equilibriumisreached.
Future research should address several limitations of the
present analysis in order to produce a better model. First and
foremost, the eﬀects of the tax should be separated from the
eﬀects of land and structures pricing.  is would illustrate
moredirectlytheeﬀectsofchangingtaxstructureandalsoal-
low for variation in construction quality and dwelling size. If
building size data were made available at the parcel level, the
assumption that land will remain in its current use could be
relaxed, and the residential and nonresidential models could
be combined. However, some level of aggregation would still
be necessary for prediction purposes, since the process of de-
veloping each parcel is unique, and accurately predicting the
future of any speci c parcel is not feasible. Another improve-
ment to the model’s accuracy could be made by including the
totalpropertytaxliability,ratherthanjustthecityandcounty
rates. Finally, development intensity could be evaluated as a




Split-rate property taxes are more eﬀective than conventional
property taxes at capturing value accruing to a property from
externalsourcessuchastransportationaccess,andalsoreduce
taxes on the portion of value created by the eﬀorts of the
owner.  eownersofparcelsadjacenttotransportationfacil- .
Table 6: Predictedchangesindevelopmentintensity.
Land Bldg. Pred. Change Pred. Change
City Ratio Rate Rate (Residential) (Nonresidential)
Minneapolis 1:1 56.286 56.286 — —
2:1 65.523 32.761 16.57% 5.89%
5:1 72.678 14.536 35.54% 24.24%
10:1 75.424 7.542 47.45% 48.84%
20:1 76.876 3.844 56.20% 73.30%
Rich eld 1:1 37.910 37.910 — —
2:1 44.165 22.082 7.67% 4.01%
5:1 49.017 9.803 14.04% 7.56%
10:1 50.880 5.088 16.59% 9.03%
20:1 51.866 2.593 17.97% 9.84%
Bloomington 1:1 31.966 31.966 — —
2:1 37.424 18.712 6.48% 2.64%
5:1 41.696 8.339 11.92% 5.52%
10:1 43.345 4.335 14.11% 6.97%
20:1 44.220 2.211 15.30% 7.84%
Note:  e rates as shown apply not to market value but to tax capacity as de ned
by Minnesota Statute 273.13. Tax capacity of residential property is de ned as
onepercentofthe rst$500,000inmarketvalueand1.25percentofremaining
value. Tax capacity for commercial property is 1.5 percent of the  rst $150,000
andtwopercentofremainingvalue.
itieswouldpayalargershareofthecostsofinfrastructureim-
provements than the owners of distant properties that would
bene tless. Aslongasassessmentswerekeptuptodate,thein-
creasedvaluewouldbecapturedautomaticallyintheproperty
tax bill and there would be no need to assess additional fees.
 e split-rate tax is perhaps the broadest value capture strat-
egy because it applies throughout a jurisdiction and re ects
changes in land value generated by sources other than trans-
portationimprovements. Ifthegoalistoleaveothervalueun-
touched,amorelocalmechanismmaybepreferred.
By in uencing developer incentives, a split-rate property
tax would be likely to lead to more dense development.  e
higher tax on land would require developers to build more
in order to recoup their expenses, while the lower tax on im-
provementswouldremoveadisincentiveforbuilding.  ere-
sults of the models described in this paper indicate that these






practice, however, the eﬀects would be contingent on the de-
mandfromtenantsformoredevelopmentandonregulations
governing land use. Because the value of land independent of
structures is diﬃcult to determine, the largest technical chal-
lenge to split-rate taxation is the accurate assessment of land
value.
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